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ABSTRACT 
Anti-atheist prejudice is cross-culturally prevalent and marked by intuitive distrust. 
However, recent research suggests that, when social perceivers know additional relevant 
information about others (i.e., their reproductive strategies), this information overrides 
religious information and nonreligious targets are trusted as much as religious targets. 
That is, perceivers seem to use religious information as a cue to a specific set of 
behavioral traits, but prioritize direct information about these traits when available. Here, 
I use this framework to explore the possibility that atheists are viewed positively in 
certain circumstances. First, atheists might be viewed positively for certain purposes 
because of their perceived reproductive strategies, even while being trusted less. Second, 
atheists who are family-oriented do not sacrifice trust, but may still be viewed positively 
for other traits (i.e., open-mindedness, scientific thinking). Third, given the constraints 
religion often imposes on behavior, atheists might be trusted more in situations where 
these constraints interfere with religious people’s inclination to cooperate. I tested these 
hypotheses using fictitious social media profiles to examine social perception. The study 
had a 3 (Target Religion: Religious, Nonreligious, or Atheist) × 3 (Target Reproductive 
Strategy: No Information, Committed, Uncommitted) experimental design (N = 550). 
Contrary to my predictions, participants did not rate atheists and nonreligious targets as 
“fast” compared to religious targets. Consistent with predictions, however, atheists and 
nonreligious individuals were rated significantly higher on perceived open-mindedness 
and scientific thinking. Finally, atheist and nonreligious targets were trusted more in two 
of the three trust domains: trust with scientific findings that contradict their worldview 
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and trust with a secret about a friend’s abortion. Further analyses compared patterns of 
responding for religious and nonreligious individuals, finding evidence for ingroup bias 
in most perceptions, but not all. Results suggest that perceptions of atheists are complex, 
but that atheists may, at least sometimes, be viewed favorably. Finally, these results point 
to the importance of reproductive strategy as a dimension of social perception, as this 
variable had a clear effect, independent of target religion, on the hypothesized 
perceptions.    
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INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of research on anti-atheist prejudice has explored a myriad of 
ways in which people view atheists unfavorably—atheists are viewed as narcissistic, 
immoral, uncaring, and exposure to atheist ideas can even facilitate an exaggerated 
disgust response (Dubendorff & Luchner, 2016; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; 
Ritter & Preston, 2011; A. Simpson & Rios, 2016). Early work even suggested a “halo 
effect,” such that religious people were viewed positively in nearly every way (Bailey & 
Doriot, 1985; Bailey & Garrou, 1983). Although attitudes toward most stigmatized 
groups have improved in recent decades, atheists are one of the few groups toward which 
stigma remains socially acceptable, even among otherwise tolerant individuals (Edgell, 
Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006). In fact, atheists may be one of the least electable groups in 
the United States and many other countries (Franks & Scherr, 2014).  
At first blush, the recent trend toward secularism in much of the world seems to 
offer an easy solution to anti-atheist prejudice—who better to tolerate the unbeliever than 
other unbelievers? Paradoxically, however, secularism may do very little to remedy 
prejudice, as even atheists in secular countries intuitively associate a wide variety of 
immoral behavior—from failing to pay a restaurant bill to serial murder—with religious 
disbelief (Gervais et al., 2017; Giddings & Dunn, 2016).   
Given that atheists are viewed so negatively in so many ways, one may wonder 
why anyone would ever identify openly as an atheist. That is, if even atheists intuitively 
distrust other atheists, is there ever anything to gain by revealing one’s disbelief? In light 
of these findings, it is unsurprising that many atheists are reluctant to report their 
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disbelief, even on anonymous surveys (Gervais & Najle, 2018; Hadaway, Marler, & 
Chaves, 1993). What is puzzling, however, is that a sizable amount of atheists are open 
about their disbelief—even to strangers, ostensibly without fear of extreme 
discrimination. Further, the existence of organizations such as the American Humanist 
Association and American Atheists suggests that, at least in some circumstances, there 
are people who not only tolerate atheists, but who actively embrace them.  
Here, I propose that perceptions of atheists are not indiscriminately negative, but 
that social perceivers use religious information to infer specific suites of traits. These 
traits may facilitate distrust in perceivers; trustworthiness is extremely important, but 
people seek a variety of traits in others (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007). Thus, even when 
viewed as untrustworthy, atheists may be viewed positively for roles that do not require 
high levels of trust.  
 Further, I propose that perceptions based on religious information are not 
inflexible, but that perceivers take additional information (e.g., education, marriage 
status) into account when forming impressions of others. When combined with additional 
information, atheism might not always lead to distrust, but might even be viewed 
positively. If this is the case, there might be circumstances where atheists are not trusted 
less than religious people, but are still viewed positively in some ways.  
Existing Research on Perceptions of Atheists 
 Many accounts of anti-atheist prejudice adopt a sociofunctional view of prejudice 
(Cook, Cottrell, & Webster, 2015; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; McArthur & Baron, 1983; 
Neuberg & Schaller, 2016), which holds that prejudice stems from the specific threat a 
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group is thought to pose. For instance, whereas some prejudices (e.g., toward Black men) 
seem to stem from the stereotype that they are physically threatening, other prejudices 
(e.g., toward homosexuals) seem to be rooted in disgust. These distinct prejudices enable 
people to act in ways that mitigate the threats others groups are (sometimes implicitly) 
assumed to pose—physical threats can influence how people view Black individuals 
(Miller, Maner, & Becker, 2010; Rodeheffer, Hill, & Lord, 2012; Schaller, Park, & 
Mueller, 2003), but macroeconomic threat can increase prejudice toward Asians, who are 
thought to pose a threat to economic resources (Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011). Thus, 
although an individual may score high on general measures of prejudice toward different 
groups, these prejudices may have qualitatively distinct causes and consequences.  
 What threats might atheists be perceived to pose? One influential view suggests 
that belief in God or gods signals one’s prosocial intent to others; conversely, then, 
disbelief may signal uncooperative intentions (Bulbulia, 2004; Norenzayan et al., 2016). 
In this framework, religious belief—specifically, belief in moralizing, punitive gods—
facilitates prosocial behavior (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007, 2011). Because atheists do 
not believe in moralizing gods that will punish their immoral behavior, it makes sense, 
then, that people might view them as “moral wildcards” (Gervais, 2013). Consistent with 
this notion, anti-atheist prejudice is characterized fundamentally by distrust rather than 
disgust or other moral emotions (Gervais et al., 2011). Similarly, although many 
researchers theorized that religious signals should facilitate ingroup trust, but outgroup 
mistrust (Atran & Ginges, 2012), there is increasing evidence that religious behavior 
increases trust, even across religious boundaries (Hall, Cohen, Meyer, Varley, & Brewer, 
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2015; McCullough, Swartwout, Carter, Shaver, & Sosis, 2016; Purzycki & Arakchaa, 
2013; Ruffle & Sosis, 2010; Tan & Vogel, 2008).  
 A number of studies by Gervais and colleagues (Gervais, 2014; Gervais et al., 
2017, 2011; see also Giddings & Dunn, 2016) have made use of the conjunction fallacy 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) to further study intuitions about atheists. The classic 
conjunction fallacy describes the scenario of Linda—a former philosophy major who 
participates in anti-nuclear demonstrations and is concerned with social justice. 
Participants are asked which of the following is more likely: (a) “Linda is a bank teller,” 
or (b) “Linda is a bank teller and a feminist” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 297). 
Because the second option is a conjunction of two probabilities (i.e., the probability that 
Linda is both a bank teller and a feminist), it cannot be more likely than the first option. 
However, because the description of Linda is representative of stereotypes about 
feminists, many participants select the second option. Critically, people only commit this 
error when the conjunction is representative of the description—for instance, people 
would not likely say Linda is a bank teller and socially conservative.  
 This method has shown that people intuitively associated immoral behavior with 
atheism, but not with religiousness (Gervais, 2014). This is true of a variety of behaviors, 
ranging from mild moral transgressions to serial murder, and has been demonstrated in 
several countries (Gervais et al., 2017). Further, it does not seem that the atheist label 
drives this effect, as the pattern of results is similar when descriptions of unbelief are 
used instead (Gervais et al., 2017; Swan & Heesacker, 2012).  
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Social Perception in Context 
Although people are quick to label immoral actors as atheists, it is not clear that 
atheists in everyday interactions are considered appreciably more likely to be serial 
murderers (Cohen & Moon, 2017). For instance, if serial murder is extremely rare, it may 
be possible that all serial murderers are assumed to be atheists, but that perceivers do not 
rate any given atheist as appreciably more likely to murder.  
Further, social perception generally occurs within a context; when people meet 
atheists, they are likely to base information on more than unbelief. At the very least, 
people are likely to encode the sex, age, and economic background of people they meet 
(Neuberg & Sng, 2013), as well as other information they are given (e.g., their career, 
whether they have children, etc.). The presence of additional diagnostic information can 
“dilute” the effect of stereotype-based judgments (Hilton & Fein, 1989) and additional 
information may even “override” the original stereotype. For instance, Williams, Sng, 
and Neuberg (2016) found that, although people in the United States rate Black men as 
physically threatening, information about a target’s ecology overrode race information, 
and Black and White men were rated similarly when they came from a similar ecology. 
This suggests that perceivers may associate race heuristically with ecology, leading to 
race stereotypes. In sum, even when people hold specific stereotypes, social perception 
depends on a mix of social information. Rather than inflexibly holding to a stereotype, 
people are capable of prioritizing information in terms of its diagnosticity of behavior.   
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Life History Strategies 
Life history theory stems from evolutionary biology, and originally examined 
how organisms maximize their reproductive fitness across the lifespan (Stearns, 1992). 
Some animals adopt a “slow” life history strategy, including an extended period of 
development and high investment in a relatively small number of offspring. In contrast, 
some organisms tend to follow a “fast” life history strategy, entailing rapid development 
and low investment in relatively large numbers of offspring. These strategies help 
organisms maximize their reproductive fitness in a given environment. Humans have a 
unique life history, including an exceptionally long lifespan, an extended period of 
development, and a notable propensity for males to support their offspring (Hill & 
Kaplan, 1999).  
Life history theory deals primarily with the timing of important events in an 
organism’s life—growth, reproduction, and senescence. In timing these events, there are 
inherent tradeoffs—because energy cannot be spent more than once, energy spent on 
growth necessarily means that less energy is available for reproductive effort. Del 
Giudice, Gangestad, and Kaplan (2015) list three primary life history tradeoffs. The first 
is between growth/maintenance and reproduction: By growing, organisms can increase 
their ability to survive, reproduce, and care for their offspring. However, delaying 
reproduction is only adaptive if an organism is likely to survive long enough to reproduce 
in the future. The second tradeoff is between quality and quantity of offspring. Broadly, 
parents can increase the “quality” of their offspring through greater parental investment. 
However, additional investment yields diminishing returns, as it limits the quantity of 
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offspring an individual has. Finally, there is a tradeoff between mating and parenting 
effort. By spending energy on mating, organisms can enhance their reproductive success, 
but will be left with fewer resources to invest in parenting.  
Life history theory has been popularly applied to a variety of psychological 
phenomena, although its popular usage is not always consistent with traditional models of 
life history (Baldini, 2015; Pepper & Nettle, 2017a). Still, empirical evidence supports 
several of these popular applications of life history theory—“harsh” ecologies tend to 
elicit more present-oriented psychology, including behavior that is relatively impulsive, 
opportunistic, sexually-driven, and less family-oriented (Frankenhuis, Panchanathan, & 
Nettle, 2016; Pepper & Nettle, 2017b). Affluent environments, on the other hand, are 
associated with increased ability to delay rewards, a more future-oriented psychology, 
sexual restrictedness, and high investment in offspring. Thus, people seem to calibrate 
their behavior both to the environment in which they were born and raised (Belsky, 
Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Petersen & Aarøe, 2015), as well as to cues in the present 
ecology (Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 2011; Nettle, Pepper, Jobling, & 
Schroeder, 2014). 
Similar lines of research have explored the personality correlates of sexual 
strategies. Schmitt and Shackelford (2008) found that, across 46 nations, sexual 
unrestrictedness was associated with higher levels of extraversion, but lower levels of 
agreeableness and conscientiousness. Other research has connected unrestricted sexual 
strategies and their consequences to the Dark Triad of personality, especially narcissism 
(Buss & Shackelford, 1997; Jonason, Li, Webster, & Schmitt, 2009; Schmitt et al., 2017). 
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In sum, there seems to be a behavioral constellation of traits associated with 
reproductive strategies. People who favor uncommitted reproductive strategies, compared 
to committed strategists, tend to be more present-oriented, more impulsive, less 
agreeable, less conscientious, more narcissistic, and less cooperative. These traits have 
wide-ranging implications for social behavior. In order to cooperate, individuals must 
delay immediate gratification for a larger reward in the future (Curry, Price, & Price, 
2008). For people in environments with high mortality or who have reason to be 
suspicious of others, this tradeoff is especially risky—the future reward might never 
come, or the cooperative partner might defect, leaving the focal individual with a lower 
payoff (Zhu, Hawk, & Chang, 2019).   
Given the rich implications of reproductive strategies for social behavior, a social 
perceiver can infer much about others by understanding how life history traits cluster 
together. For instance, because sexually unrestrictedness is positively correlated with 
several anti-social behaviors (Jonason et al., 2009), individuals who intuitively associate 
these traits may be better able to discern the cooperative value of others. Accordingly, 
intuitions about these suites of traits seem to play a large role in stereotyping, as people 
seem to infer corresponding “fast” or “slow” traits when given information about a 
person’s ecology or other relevant life history information (Neuberg & Sng, 2013; 
Williams et al., 2016). 
Religion and Reproductive Strategies 
A growing body of research has explored the implications of sexual strategies in 
the scientific study of religion, finding that religiosity across the world tends to be highly 
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associated with a preference for restricted sexuality and an opposition to sexuality 
promiscuity and associated behaviors (McCullough, Carter, DeWall, & Corrales, 2012; 
McCullough, Enders, Brion, & Jain, 2005; Rowatt & Schmitt, 2003; Schmitt & Fuller, 
2015; Weeden, Cohen, & Kenrick, 2008; Weeden & Kurzban, 2013). In turn, religious 
people tend to exhibit the traits that generally correlate with these strategies—they 
discount the future less (Carter, McCullough, Kim-Spoon, Corrales, & Blake, 2012), 
have higher levels of self-control (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009), and are more 
agreeable (McCullough et al., 2005; McCullough, Tsang, & Brion, 2003; Saroglou, 
2002). Finally, at least in some contexts, religious people tend to be somewhat more 
cooperative and prosocial (Everett, Haque, & Rand, 2016; K. A. Johnson, Cohen, & 
Okun, 2013; Purzycki et al., 2016; Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2016). 
These findings have led some to characterize religions as fostering a type of slow life 
history strategy (Baumard & Chevallier, 2015; Baumard, Hyafil, Morris, & Boyer, 2015; 
but see Purzycki et al., 2018). In the present study, I will refer to committed reproductive 
strategies and the associated traits as “slow,” and uncommitted strategies and associated 
traits as “fast.” Many of these traits (especially personality traits) are not derived from 
life history per se. However, attempts to connect life history strategies to personality 
(Figueredo, Vásquez, Brumbach, & Schneider, 2007; Manson, 2017; Sherman, 
Figueredo, & Funder, 2013) have generally corroborated the findings reviewed above 
about the personality correlates of reproductive strategies (e.g., Schmitt & Shackelford, 
2008).  
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Perceptions of Religious People Based on Reproductive Strategies 
Recently, Moon, Krems, and Cohen (2018a) found that people view religious 
individuals as committed reproductive strategists and as “slow” in corresponding ways—
as unimpulsive, invested in their education, and coming from a less “rough” environment. 
In turn, these perceptions influenced trust. That is, religious targets were trusted because 
of perceptions about their slow life history strategy. However, when information was 
provided about the target’s reproductive strategy, participants instead trusted the 
committed (vs. uncommitted) strategists and did not significantly base their perceptions 
on religion.  
These findings suggest two possible avenues for positive perceptions of atheists. 
First, atheists might be viewed positively in some respects because of their perceived 
uncommitted mating strategies. That is, even if uncommitted strategists are less trusted, 
they may be viewed positively for traits associated with these strategies, such as 
extraversion and social prowess (Schmitt & Shackelford, 2008; Sherman et al., 2013). At 
least in some circumstances, people are likely to desire these traits in others.  
Second, when additional information (e.g., reproductive strategy) is provided, 
atheists might be trusted to as similar extent as religious individuals, but might also be 
seen as posing some additional affordances. That is, if nonreligious individuals are 
trusted as much as religious individuals when their reproductive strategy is specified 
(Moon et al., 2018a), people might still make some inferences based on religious beliefs 
(e.g., that atheists are more open-minded). This might create circumstances in which 
atheists are not only trusted, but are viewed favorably.   
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Potentially Desirable Traits of Atheists 
 Positive Perceptions Based on Reproductive Strategies. As reviewed above, 
early research on sexual or life history strategies and personality generally found fast 
strategists as possessing mostly undesirable traits—they tend to be more Machiavellian, 
less agreeable, and more opportunistic (Figueredo et al., 2007). However, as pointed out 
by Sherman et al. (2013), as fast and slow life history strategies are both adaptive in 
certain circumstances, neither is likely to possess solely undesirable traits. Thus, they 
analyzed distinctive life history, which controlled for the “normalness” of slow strategies. 
Using this method, they found that fast life history strategists possess some negative (e.g., 
unpredictable, manipulative) and some positive (e.g., socially skilled, charming) traits 
(Sherman et al., 2013).  
            If nonreligious individuals are viewed as fast life history strategists, and fast life 
history strategists have a specific suite of positive traits, they might be viewed positively 
in certain circumstances. That is, they might be viewed favorably because of their fast 
life history traits—although less trustworthy, they may be viewed simultaneously as more 
outgoing, more fun, and more socially dominant. These traits will likely lead perceivers 
to rate them as poor caregivers, but as excellent friends for risky adventures and short-
term sexual partners.  
Positive Perceptions Unrelated to Reproductive Strategies. Atheists differ 
from religious individuals in some important ways that are not directly related to 
reproductive strategies. Specifically, nonreligious individuals tend to use analytic 
thinking more frequently (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; 
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Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012), be 
more open-minded (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014), be more 
dedicated to scientific knowledge (Harris, 2006), be more intelligent (Kanazawa, 2010; 
Lynn, Harvey, & Nyborg, 2009; Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013), display less 
ingroup bias (Hobson & Inzlicht, 2016; M. K. Johnson, Rowatt, & Labouff, 2012), and 
are perhaps less susceptible to intergroup conflict (Neuberg et al., 2014). These traits also 
may have significant implications for social perceivers; that is, knowing the extent to 
which another person has these traits can is useful for perceivers in navigating social 
interactions. Indeed, there is some evidence that people view atheists as relatively open to 
experience (Jackson, Halberstadt, Jong, & Felman, 2015) and scientifically competent 
(Harper, 2007; Rios, Cheng, Totton, & Shariff, 2015).  
Perceivers tend to prioritize direct information about life history strategies when 
available, as opposed to cues, like religion or race, that merely hint at life history 
information (Moon et al., 2018a; Williams et al., 2016); thus, positive perceptions of 
atheists based on perceived “fast” traits will likely diminish when perceivers have direct 
information about a target’s reproductive strategy. However, positive perceptions that are 
unrelated to life history may remain even in the face of direct life history information. In 
other words, direct information about a target’s reproductive strategy should override 
perceptions about an atheist target’s life history traits, but additional perceptions based on 
religious information may remain. This raises the possibility of a scenario in which 
atheists might not be viewed as untrustworthy, but instead may be perceived positively on 
these specific dimensions.  
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Domains of Trust. Trust has been broadly defined as “the willingness to rely on 
an exchange partner in whom one has confidence” (Lewin & Johnston, 1997, p. 28). In 
essence, trust represents a willingness to make one’s welfare vulnerable to another 
(Deutsch, 1960; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; for a review, see J. A. Simpson, 
2007). In turn, people use a variety of cues to gauge the trustworthiness of others: 
religious belief and behavior (Hall et al., 2015; McCullough et al., 2016), facial cues 
(Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009), prior altruistic behavior (Barclay, 2004), and 
intuitive moral judgments (i.e., people who make deontological moral judgments are 
more trusted; Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016).   
However, although some individuals may be generally trustworthy (i.e., inclined 
to cooperate when trusted by others), trust not only requires a trustor and a trusted person, 
but also some cooperative arrangement at stake (Hardin, 2003). In other words, trust 
takes the form of “I trust you to do X” (J. A. Simpson, 2007, p. 588), where “X” can be 
anything from pumping gas to watching over another person’s child for long periods of 
time. Some people may be trusted for some purposes, but not others. 
Why might the “X” be important for trust toward religious individuals? Religious 
belief and acculturation has profound psychological implications, shaping people’s moral 
judgment, self-construal, and intergroup relations (Cohen, 2015; Cohen & Rozin, 2001). 
Because religious people tend to view religious tenets as divinely inspired or sacred, they 
are generally unlikely to compromise on them (Rappaport, 1999), even when is in their 
interests (or the interests of those they care about) to do so. Understanding these 
influences of religion is critical to understanding why religion is sometimes associated 
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with prosocial behavior (Everett, Haque, et al., 2016; Shariff et al., 2016), but can also 
spur aggressive or antisocial behavior (Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & Busath, 2007; 
DeBono, Shariff, Poole, & Muraven, 2017; Jackson & Gray, 2018). In sum, one might 
expect that, when an individual’s religious belief constrains his or her behavior or beliefs 
about “X,” people might be less trusting toward religious individuals in those contexts. 
Below, I outline three domains in which this might be the case.   
Honesty in science. Religious adherents have a vested interest in maintaining 
their religious faith. Religious beliefs and the associated behaviors provide access to a 
number of social benefits. Religious groups can be especially cohesive (Graham & Haidt, 
2010) and provide larger social networks and safety nets; indeed, there is a positive 
association between religiosity and subjective well-being, largely because of higher 
levels of perceived meaning in life, respect, and social support (Diener, Tay, & Myers, 
2011). Even without a conscious analysis of the costs and benefits of religious 
membership, religious individuals are likely to feel protective of their faith. 
Religious individuals (at least in heterogeneous societies) also have a vested 
interest in maintaining their reputation among people who do not share their religious 
belief. In this pursuit, their interest is in making their religious beliefs as credible as 
possible—indeed, there is extreme stigma associated with being a member of a cult or 
practicing folk magic (Ayella, 1990). Thus, religious people are likely to be averse to 
anything that makes their religious belief seem less credible to others. Indeed, many 
people go to great lengths to make their religion appear credible or legitimate to others 
(for instance, through marketing campaigns, community outreach, etc.).  
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What do these incentives mean for trust? To the extent that the “X” might 
interfere with a religious person’s motives to maintain the credibility of his or her 
religion, one might expect religious people to be less trustworthy. One “X” that might 
influence the trustworthiness of religious people is science. 
Science sometimes conflicts with the tenets of certain religions. More 
importantly, may people at least view science and religion as in conflict (Barbour, 2000; 
Evans, 2011; Rios et al., 2015). Thus, religious people—whether consciously or not—
might be especially skeptical of scientific findings that contradict their religious beliefs 
(Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Klaczynski, 2000). If it comes to it, they may even have an 
incentive to cover up the threatening findings (especially if they view this dishonesty as 
mandated by God; see Jackson & Gray, 2018). In other words, when it comes to 
evaluating and reporting scientific findings that contradict one’s worldview, religious 
people may actually be less trustworthy than atheists or nonreligious people. In turn, 
people may view religious individuals (compared to nonreligious individuals) as less 
likely to disseminate scientific findings that challenge their worldview.  
Ingroup favoritism. Although religious people tend to be trusted, even by 
outgroups, there is a wealth of research showing that religious people are not 
indiscriminately prosocial, but that their prosociality is generally parochial—directed 
toward other ingroup members (Galen, 2012; Hobson & Inzlicht, 2016). Religious people 
tend to view their groups as divinely appointed, and are often willing to go to extreme 
lengths to protect their group—one extreme example of this concept is suicide terrorism 
(Atran, 2003; Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009).  
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Because religious people may view their group’s interest as superordinate, 
conflicts may arise when the interests of the group are inconsistent with the interests of 
individuals. In this light, is perhaps not surprising that, when scandals erupt, people are 
often willing to sacrifice the wellbeing of individuals (e.g., victims of abuse) to protect 
the reputation of their group. This process likely extends beyond religious groups, and 
likely applies to other coalitions as well (e.g., such scandals and cover-ups have been 
well documented in political coalitions, and have deleterious effects on public opinion of 
politicians; Schwarz & Bles, 1992). However, given the cohesive natural of religious 
groups, religious people may be especially likely to cover up scandals that threaten their 
group’s reputation. In turn, observers may view religious people as less trustworthy when 
it comes to reporting such scandals.    
Sexual transgressions. One of the most consistent predictors of religious belief 
across the world is a preference for committed reproductive strategies: sexual 
restrictedness, monogamy, and high-investment in children (Schmitt & Fuller, 2015; 
Weeden et al., 2008; Weeden & Kurzban, 2013); this observation sheds light on many 
phenomena associated with religion. Accordingly, religious people tend to be especially 
intolerant of sexual transgressions. This “sex premium” (Hone, McCauley, Pedersen, & 
McCullough, 2018) in religious moral judgment reflects the propensity of religious 
people to view sexual transgressions as even more immoral than uncooperative 
transgressions (Hone et al., 2018; Weeden & Kurzban, 2013). 
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Does the Atheist Label Matter? 
 Some authors have attributed anti-atheist prejudice to the stigma of the label 
“atheist.” To test whether social perceivers respond differently to religious disbelievers 
when explicitly labeled as atheists, Swan and Heesacker (2012) compared the perceptions 
of profiles of nonreligious (described as “without belief in God”) and atheist targets to the 
profile of a religious target. They found that, although the atheist target received slightly 
more negative evaluations than the nonreligious target (and both were rated more 
negatively than the religious target), this difference was not statistically significant. 
Similarly, Gervais and colleagues (2017) showed that participants tend to view immoral 
behavior as representative of religious disbelief, whether or not the term “atheist” is used.  
 Thus, it seems that the atheist label itself has minimal influence on 
perceptions of atheists. However, a secondary purpose of the present study is to test 
whether the present framework extends to atheist targets (rather than just nonreligious 
targets), and whether perceptions of atheists and nonreligious individuals are 
meaningfully different across domains.  
The Present Research 
 The literature reviewed above suggest that irreligion may be used a cue, not only 
for “fast” traits, but also open-mindedness and scientific thinking. Further, inferences 
about “fast” traits (but not open-mindedness and scientific thinking) might be overridden 
by more direct information about targets’ reproductive strategies.  
 The present study will test these hypotheses by comparing perceptions of 
religious, nonreligious, and atheist targets, and with committed, uncommitted, and 
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unspecified reproductive strategies. Dependent measures will include measures of 
perceived “slows” traits, “fast” traits (both desirable and undesirable), open-mindedness, 
and scientific-orientation.  
 Hypothesis 1: People will rate atheist and nonreligious targets (compared to 
religious targets) higher on both positive and negative traits of fast life history strategists 
(for instance, fun but also impulsive). Conversely, I expect the religious target to be rated 
higher on positive traits of slow life history strategists (for instance, more agreeable and 
nurturing).  
 Hypothesis 2: When additional information about target life history is provided 
(i.e., the target’s reproductive strategy), people will rate uncommitted targets (i.e., those 
who prefer sexual variety over commitment) as fast life history strategists, and will rely 
less on information about the target’s religious beliefs in making inferences about life 
history traits.  
 Hypothesis 3: Atheist and nonreligious targets will be rated as more open-minded 
and scientifically minded than the religious target, and this effect should hold across 
conditions of life history information (i.e., whether they are presented as following a 
committed, uncommitted, or unspecified reproductive strategy).   
 Hypothesis 4: Atheist and nonreligious targets will be rated as more trustworthy 
than the religious target in certain domains—specifically, they will be rated more likely 
to report scientific results that conflict with their worldview, more likely to report crimes 
that might threaten the reputation of their group, and more likely to keep a secret about a 
friend’s abortion.  
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METHOD 
Participants 
 Based on the effect sizes found in Moon et al. (2018a) and two pilot studies 
(Cohen’s f = 0.14), a priori power analysis indicated that a sample of 387 participants 
would provide adequate (.80) power. To account for potential exclusions and effect sizes 
smaller than anticipated, I recruited 601 participants via Prolific Academic (an alternative 
to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk; Peer, Samat, Brandimarte, & Acquisti, 2016) to complete 
a survey on “impressions of others” in exchange for $0.78, filtering for participants 
located in the United States who are at least 18 years old. Fifty-one participants were 
excluded from all analyses because they failed at least one of two attention check 
questions; the first consisted of two items in the same measure, one instructing the 
respondent to select 7, the other to select 1. The second attention check included a page 
instructing participants not to answer the question on the following page (Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), which asked which of four food items contained gluten. 
The final sample included 550 participants (240 female), whose ages ranged from 18 to 
75 (M = 31.92, SD = 11.49). The most common religious identifications among 
participants were agnostic (n = 143), atheist (n = 138), Protestant (n = 69), Catholic (n = 
57), and spiritual but not religious (n = 54).  
Procedure 
 The study used a 3 (Target Religion: Believes in God, Nonreligious, Atheist) × 3 
(Target Reproductive Strategy: Committed, Uncommitted, No Information) between-
subjects design. After providing informed consent (Appendix A), participants were 
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randomly assigned to view one of the nine possible social media profiles (see Appendix 
B). All profiles included the same distractor information, such as favorite food and 
hobbies, and will differ only in religion (Christian, Nonreligious, or Atheist) and “dating 
preferences” (“My goal is to get married and start a family,” “I’d prefer to stay single and 
continue playing the field,” or no information).  
 After viewing the profiles for at least 15 seconds, participants rated the target on 
several dimensions using a 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely) scale (see 
Appendix C for all measures): positive slow traits (5-item scale; α = .90),  positive fast 
traits (8-item scale; α = .87), negative fast traits (5-item scale; α = .85), trust (6-item 
measure adapted from Hall et al., 2015; α = .91), open-mindedness (α = .95), and 
scientific thinking (α = .92). These scales were presented in random order, and the order 
of items was randomized within each scale. Next, participants assessed the target in three 
distinct domains of trust (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely): (1) how likely 
they would be to report scientific results honestly, even if the results were inconsistent 
with their worldview; (2) how likely they would be to report sexual misconduct, even if it 
could ruin the reputation of their group; (3) how likely they would be to keep a friend’s 
abortion secret. Finally, participants completed a 7-item measure of religiosity (α = .96) 
based on Cohen, Malka, Rozin, and Cherfas (2006). On a 1 (not at all) to 7 (deeply or 
extremely) scale, median participant religiosity was 2.00 (M = 2.66, SD = 1.76).  
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1: Nonreligious/atheist targets are viewed as fast life history strategists  
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 To test Hypothesis 1, I used simple comparisons (nonreligious/atheist vs. religious 
targets) to test the effect of target religion on slow/fast perceptions and trust when the 
target’s reproductive strategy is not specified (i.e., the no information condition).   
 Desirable Slow Traits. As shown in Figure 1, when reproductive strategy was 
not specified, the religious target (M = 4.83, SD = 1.11) was rated somewhat more likely 
to possess positive slow traits than the nonreligious (M = 4.66, SD = 1.15) and atheist (M 
= 4.61, SD = 0.89) targets. Contrary to my hypothesis, however, a planned contrast 
comparing religious vs. nonreligious/atheist targets suggested that this difference was not 
statistically significant, F(1, 541) = 1.55, p = .214. An additional contrast suggested that 
the atheist and nonreligious targets did not receive significantly different ratings on 
positive slow traits, F(1, 541) = 0.06, p = .801.  
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Figure 1. Perceived positive slow traits as a function of target religion and target 
reproductive strategy. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
 Undesirable Fast Traits. As shown in Figure 2, when reproductive strategy was 
not specified, the religious target was rated as somewhat less likely to possess negative 
fast traits (M = 3.52, SD = 1.18) than the nonreligious (M = 3.67, SD = 1.18) and atheist 
(M = 3.89, SD = 0.83) targets, although this contrast was not statistically significant, F(1, 
541) = 2.65, p = .104. An additional contrast suggested that there was no significant 
difference between the nonreligious and atheist targets, F(1, 541) = 1.44, p = .231.  
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Figure 2. Perceived negative fast traits as a function of target religion and target 
reproductive strategy. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
 Desirable Fast Traits. As shown in Figure 3, when reproductive strategy was not 
specified, the religious target was rated less likely to possess positive fast traits (M = 
4.32, SD = 0.93) than the nonreligious (M = 4.66, SD = 0.98) and atheist (M = 4.86, SD = 
0.73) targets. A planned contrast comparing the religious target with the nonreligious and 
atheist targets was significant, F(1, 541) = 9.62, p = .002, η𝑝2  = .017, suggesting that 
nonreligious and atheist targets are rated more likely to possess positive behavioral traits 
associated with uncommitted strategies. An additional contrast suggested that there was 
no significant difference in ratings for the nonreligious and atheist targets, F(1, 541) = 
1.73, p = .188. 
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Figure 3. Perceived positive fast traits as a function of target religion and target 
reproductive strategy. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
 Trust. As shown in Figure 4, when reproductive strategy was not specified, the 
religious, nonreligious, and atheist targets were rated similarly on trust. A contrast 
comparing the nonreligious and atheist targets to the religious target was not significant, 
F(1, 541) = 0.92, p = .338. There was also no significant difference between the atheist 
and nonreligious targets, F(1, 541) = 0.44, p = .505. This finding represents a failure to 
replicate the common finding that religious people are more trusted than nonreligious 
people, and that people distrust atheists (Gervais et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2015; 
McCullough et al., 2016; Tan & Vogel, 2008). I address this issue further in the 
discussion.  
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Figure 4. Perceived trustworthiness as a function of target religion and target 
reproductive strategy. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Information about reproductive strategy will reduce perceivers’ 
reliance on religious information  
 For each dependent variable, I used planned contrasts to test (a) whether the effect 
of target religion (religious vs. atheist/nonreligious) on fast/slow inferences (and trust) is 
stronger when reproductive strategy is specified than when it is not specified and (b) 
whether people make inferences about life history traits based on the target’s reported 
reproductive strategy (i.e., comparing the uncommitted and committed conditions). These 
contrasts were specified a priori; however, Hypothesis 2 largely relies on the support of 
Hypothesis 1. That is, Hypothesis 2 suggests that information about reproductive 
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strategies might “override” fast/slow inferences, but Hypothesis 1 was largely 
unsupported, meaning that there was no significant effect to override.  
 I also ran a second contrast for each dependent variable, comparing the effects of 
target reproductive strategy on fast/slow inferences. A significant effect would signify 
that people make inferences about fast/slow traits (and trust) based on targets’ 
reproductive strategies, viewing committed strategists as “slower” and more trustworthy.   
 Slow Traits. The effect of target religion (religious vs. atheist/nonreligious) was 
not significantly stronger in the no information condition than in the 
uncommitted/committed conditions, F(1, 541) = 0.92, p =.338. However, a comparison 
between the uncommitted and committed targets revealed a significant effect, F(1, 541) = 
55.81, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .094, such that committed strategists are rated as possessing more 
positive slow traits than uncommitted strategists (see Figure 1).  
 Undesirable Fast Traits. Again, the effect of target religion (religious vs. 
atheist/nonreligious) was not significantly stronger in the no information condition than 
in the uncommitted/committed conditions, F(1, 541) = 1.08, p =.299. However, a 
comparison between the uncommitted and committed targets revealed a significant effect, 
F(1, 541) = 66.54, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .105, such that uncommitted strategists are rated as 
possessing more negative fast traits than committed strategists (see Figure 2).  
 Desirable Fast Traits. Again, the effect of target religion (religious vs. 
atheist/nonreligious) was not significantly stronger in the no information condition than 
in the uncommitted/committed conditions, F(1, 541) = 0.00, p =.979. As in the previous 
two analyses, however, a comparison between the uncommitted and committed targets 
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again revealed a significant effect, F(1, 541) = 5.23, p = .023, η𝑝2  = .010, such that 
uncommitted strategists are rated as possessing more positive fast traits than committed 
strategists, although the effect is less consistent (see Figure 3).  
 Trust. The effect of target religion was not significantly different in the no 
information condition than in the uncommitted/committed conditions, F(1, 541) = 0.00, p 
= .956. As outlined above, this is inconsistent with past literature finding religious belief 
and behaviors to facilitate trust in perceivers. Although this analysis failed to replicate 
this effect, a comparison between committed and uncommitted targets replicated Moon et 
al.’s (2018a) effect, such that committed targets are trusted more than uncommitted 
targets, F(1, 541) = 30.81, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .054 (see Figure 4).  
 Hypothesis 3: Atheists and nonreligious people will be viewed as more open-minded 
and scientific   
 For each dependent variable (i.e., open-mindedness and scientific thinking), I 
used planned contrasts to assess (a) whether nonreligious/atheist targets were rated more 
likely to harbor these traits than the religious target, (b) whether this holds across all 
conditions of target reproductive strategy, and (c) whether nonreligious and atheist targets 
were rated differently on these traits.  
 Open-Mindedness. An omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
target religion on perceived open-mindedness, F(2, 541) = 27.66, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .093, but 
the effect of target reproductive strategy was not significant, F(2, 541) = 2.31, p = .100. 
A planned contrast compared the nonreligious/atheist conditions to the religious 
condition, within each level of target reproductive strategy. This contrast was significant 
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at each level of target reproductive strategy: no information, F(1, 541) = 10.23, p = .001, 
η𝑝
2  = .019; uncommitted, F(1, 541) = 26.99, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .048; committed, F(1, 541) = 
16.48, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .030, suggesting that nonreligious and atheist targets were assumed 
to be significantly more open-minded than religious targets, regardless of their reported 
reproductive strategy (see Figure 5).  
 Additional contrasts compared the atheist and nonreligious conditions across 
levels of target reproductive strategy; this comparison was significant when the target 
was committed, F(1, 541) = 4.19, p = .041, η𝑝2  = .008, but not when the target was 
uncommitted, F(1, 541) = 1.34, p = .248, or when reproductive strategy was not 
specified, F(1, 541) = 0.09, p = .764.  
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Figure 5. Perceived open-mindedness as a function of target religion and target 
reproductive strategy. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
 Scientific Thinking. An omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
target religion on perceived scientific thinking, F(2, 541) = 85.11, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .239, as 
well as a significant effect of target reproductive strategy, F(2, 541) = 5.64, p = .004, η𝑝2  
= .020. Planned contrasts suggested that nonreligious/atheist targets were viewed as more 
likely to exhibit scientific thinking across all levels of target reproductive strategy: no 
information, F(1, 541) = 48.96, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .083; uncommitted, F(1, 541) = 39.04, p < 
.001, η𝑝2  = .067; committed, F(1, 541) = 113.89, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .111. This analysis 
suggests that people view atheists and nonreligious individuals as more likely than 
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religious people to engage in scientific thought, regardless of the target’s reproductive 
strategy (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Perceived scientific thinking as a function of target religion and target 
reproductive strategy. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
 Comparing the atheist and nonreligious targets suggested that the atheist target 
was rated higher on scientific thinking than the nonreligious target in the no information, 
F(1, 541) = 12.17, p = .001, η𝑝2  = .022, and in the uncommitted condition, F(1, 541) = 
5.38, p < .021, η𝑝2  = .010, but not in the committed condition, F(1, 541) = 2.48, p < .116. 
Hypothesis 4: Atheists and nonreligious people will be trusted more than religious 
people in certain contexts 
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 For each trust scenario, I tested (a) whether nonreligious/atheist targets were rated 
more trustworthy across levels of target reproductive strategy and (b) whether ratings of 
nonreligious and atheist targets differed.  
 Scientific Trust. An omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
target religion on perceived scientific trust, F(2, 541) = 13.23, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .047. The 
effect of target reproductive strategy was not statistically significant, F(2, 541) = 2.53, p 
= .080. As shown in Figure 7, the nonreligious and atheist targets were rated higher on 
scientific trust than the religious target across all levels of target reproductive strategy. 
Planned contrasts suggested that this effect was significant at all levels: no information, 
F(1, 541) = 3.85, p = .050, η𝑝2  = .007; uncommitted, F(1, 541) = 8.45, p = .004, η𝑝2  = 
.015; committed, F(1, 541) = 15.20, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .027. Contrasts comparing the atheist 
and nonreligious targets across levels of target reproductive strategy suggested they were 
not rated significantly different on scientific trust (ps > .271).  
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Figure 7. Perceived scientific trust as a function of target religion and target reproductive 
strategy. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
 Trust at the Expense of One’s Group. An omnibus ANOVA did not reveal a 
significant effect of target religion on likelihood of reporting sexual abuse at the expense 
of one’s group, F(2, 541) = 0.05, p = .952. However, there was a significant effect of 
target reproductive strategy, F(2, 541) = 5.39, p = .005, η𝑝2  = .020. Because there was no 
main effect of target religion, I did not probe these effects further. 
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Figure 8. Perceived likelihood of reporting a crime that would compromise the target’s 
group’s reputation as a function of target religion and target reproductive strategy. Error 
bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
 Trust with an Abortion Secret. An omnibus ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of target religion on perceived trust with an abortion secret, F(2, 541) = 
36.62, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .119, as well as a main effect of target reproductive strategy, F(2, 
541) = 5.91, p = .003, η𝑝2  = .021. Planned contrasts indicated that nonreligious/atheist 
targets were trusted more with an abortion secret than the religious target, and that this 
effect held across all levels of target reproductive strategy: no information, F(1, 541) = 
26.01, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .046; uncommitted, F(1, 541) = 14.65, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .026; 
committed, F(1, 541) = 34.85, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .061. There were no significant differences 
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between the atheist and nonreligious targets across any level of target reproductive 
strategy (ps > .567). This analysis suggests that nonreligious people (whether or not they 
self-identify as atheists) are rated more trustworthy than religious people with a secret 
about abortion (see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Perceived likelihood of keeping an abortion secret as a function of target 
religion and target reproductive strategy. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. 
 
Exploratory Analyses 
 In light of the above findings, I conducted several additional analyses to (a) 
examine the factor structures of the utilized measures and (b) test whether the patterns of 
results differ significantly between participants who are religious vs. nonreligious.  
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 Examining the Factor Structure of the Utilized Measures. First, I examined 
the factor structure of the measures of fast/slow perceptions and trust.  
 Trust. Principle axis factoring using the six trust items suggested that a single 
factor accounted for 69.6% of the variance, with an eigenvalue of 4.17. The next highest 
eigenvalue was 0.52, suggesting a one-factor solution. However, one additional 
possibility is that religious and nonreligious individuals utilize the scale differently (i.e., 
that the measure is not invariant for religious and nonreligious individuals). To examine 
the factor structure for religious and nonreligious individuals separately, I first examined 
inter-item correlations separately for religious and nonreligious individuals (see Table 1). 
Inter-item correlations ranged from .57 to .80 for religious participants, and from .48 to 
.74.  
Table 1: Inter-item correlations for the 6-item trust measure. The lower triangle 
represents results for nonreligious participants (n = 335), while the upper triangle 
represents results for religious participants (n = 191).  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Benevolent 
 
– .66 .62 .68 .57 .62 
2. Has integrity 
 
.57 – .74 .80 .63 .67 
3. Has the ability to be trustworthy 
 
.53 .71 – .73 .68 .70 
4. Is trustworthy 
 
.55 .74 .70 – .73 .70 
5. If you loaned this person money, 
you would expect to get it back 
.54 .61 .56 .65 – .73 
6. Can be trusted with a sensitive 
secret 
.48 .66 .58 .73 .58 – 
 
 Next, to test whether a one-factor solution described the data well for both 
religious and nonreligious individuals, I conducted a principle axis factoring on the trust 
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items separately for religious and nonreligious participants (i.e., all participants who 
reported a religious affiliation vs. all those who reported no religious affiliation). Results 
were largely similar. For the nonreligious participants, one factor explained 67.2% of the 
variance (first three eigenvalues: 4.10, 0.81, 0.45); for religious participants, one factor 
explained 73.6% of the variance (first three eigenvalues: 4.42, 0.47, 0.38). Cronbach’s 
alpha suggested similar reliability estimates for both sets of participants (αreligious = .93, 
αnonreligious = .90). Thus, I concluded that a single factor solution describes the data well 
for both religious and nonreligious participants.  
 Slow and Fast Traits. Next, I used principal axis factoring with oblique (oblimin) 
rotation to explore the factor structure of the utilized measures of perceptions of slow and 
fast (both desirable and undesirable) traits. An analysis of the scree plot suggested that 
two or three factors explain the data well. The first five eigenvalues were 6.81, 3.25, 1.32, 
0.94, and 0.78. Factor loadings are shown in Table 2, and suggest that perceived slow 
traits loaded on one factor (factor 1), undesirable fast traits loaded on another (factor 2), 
and desirable fast traits (except item 7) on yet another (factor 3). These results offer 
tentative support for the use of these measures; however, confirmatory factor analysis 
using an additional sample would provide stronger support for these measures.  
 Open-Mindedness and Scientific Thinking. I used the same method (i.e., 
principal axis factoring with oblique rotation) to examine the factor structure of the open-
mindedness and scientific thinking measures. The scree plot suggested that two factors 
explain the data well. The first five eigenvalues were 4.72, 1.31, 0.27, 0.22, and 0.19. 
Factor loadings are shown in Table 3, and suggest that the open-mindedness items 
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loading on one factor (factor 1) whereas the scientific thinking items load on another 
factor (factor 2).  
Table 2: Factor Loadings from a Principal Axis Factoring of Slow and Fast Perceptions 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Slow Traits    
1. Would be a sympathetic listener .703 –.140 –.055 
2. Has an agreeable personality .714 .034 –.172 
3. Tries to be helpful .820 .034 –.080 
4. Warm .890 .036 –.062 
5. Would be nurturing with children .743 –.068 .121 
Desirable Fast Traits    
6. Would be fun to party with –.080 –.005 –.864 
7. Says what he means regardless of the 
consequences –.028 .148 –.372 
8. Can tell a good joke .081 –.030 –.724 
9. Fun to be around .113 –.119 –.758 
10. Is socially skilled .188 –.032 –.565 
11. Would be a good "wing man" –.051 –.058 –.744 
12. Is good in bed .073 –.031 –.556 
13. Is cool .129 –.111 –.711 
Undesirable Fast Traits    
14. Gets angry quickly .035 .806 .152 
15. Often acts impulsively –.168 .599 –.179 
16. Tries to be socially dominant –.093 .646 –.144 
17. Can become hostile to people who disagree with 
him .077 .813 .219 
18. His behavior is unpredictable –.051 .658 –.026 
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Table 3: Factor Loadings from a Principal Axis Factoring of Open-Mindedness and 
Scientific Thinking 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
Open-Mindedness   
1. Open to alternative viewpoints .921 –.039 
2. Tries to keep an open mind .894 .018 
3. Listens to both sides of important issues .920 –.026 
4. Considers differing opinions when forming an opinion .861 .067 
Scientific Thinking   
5. Interested in scientific knowledge –.031 .858 
6. Cares a lot about logical reasoning .012 .947 
7. Tries to base all his beliefs upon facts, evidence, and 
logic .031 .855 
 
 Do Ratings Differ Systematically Across Participant Religious Affiliation? A 
large body of social psychological research has demonstrated the ways in which people 
are predisposed to favor members of their own group and people are similar to them (e.g., 
Bernhard, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2006; Choi & Bowles, 2007; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). Thus, it is likely that participants of differing religious backgrounds may 
show some degree of ingroup bias, giving more favorable ratings to targets that seem to 
share their group membership, or who are more similar to them. Consistent with this 
notion, prejudice toward atheists is most severe among the highly religious (Edgell et al., 
2006; Gervais et al., 2017) as well as people who oppose short-term mating strategies 
(Moon, Krems, & Cohen, 2018b).  
 Group membership may influence perceptions of others beyond simply liking 
ingroup members more. For instance, a perceiver might rate the same face as more 
attractive when it is presented as a member of his or her ingroup. Thus, even if atheists 
39 
 
are objectively more likely to exhibit a certain trait (e.g., open-mindedness), religious 
people may not perceive them as such. This type of bias may carry some benefits—it 
facilitates allegiance to one’s group, and may avoid the costs of attempting to cooperate 
with outgroup members, who may have diverging interests. On the other hand, to the 
extent that people engage with others based on the affordances they pose (McArthur & 
Baron, 1983), accurate or objective social perception may be beneficial—if an individual 
is unstable or uncooperative, it is beneficial for perceivers to avoid cooperating with him 
or her, whether or not they share group membership.   
 To test whether religious and nonreligious participants showed different patterns 
of responding to the different targets, I computed a variable denoting whether participants 
were religious (i.e., they reported any religious affiliation) or not (i.e., they reported being 
either atheist, nonreligious, or spiritual but not religious). Although there may be 
meaningful differences between the religious groups (for instance, Jews tend to be less 
prejudiced toward atheists than Muslims or Christians; Hughes, Grossmann, & Cohen, 
2015), the dataset did not include a large enough sample from each religious group to 
explore these nuances in any meaningful way.   
 For each fast/slow variable and trust, I ran the contrasts from Hypothesis 1 (i.e., 
comparing the nonreligious and atheist targets to religious targets within the no 
information level of target reproductive strategy). In cases where these contrasts were 
significant, I also conducted the contrast from Hypothesis 2, which tested whether 
reproductive strategy overrode the inferences based on religious information. For open-
mindedness, scientific thinking, and the domains of trust, I did not expect the effect of 
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target religion to differ across levels of target reproductive strategy. Thus, I ran a contrast 
comparing nonreligious and atheist targets to religious targets, but collapsed across levels 
of target strategy. As running these analyses separately significantly reduced the sample 
size, power is also reduced for these analyses, especially for analyses of the religious 
participants. Thus, I urge caution in interpreting these results. 
 Slow Traits. The results described above failed to find an effect of target religion 
on perceived slow traits. However, using the same contrast as above (i.e., comparing the 
atheist/nonreligious vs. religious targets within the no information level of target 
strategy), but separately for religious and nonreligious participants, found no significant 
effect for nonreligious participants, F(1, 326) = 0.17, p = .684, but a significant effect for 
religious participants, F(1, 182) = 6.62, p = .011, η𝑝2  = .035, such that religious 
participants view the religious targets as “slower” than the atheist and nonreligious 
targets. Next, I conducted the contrast from Hypothesis 2 (testing whether the effect of 
target religion was reduced when reproductive strategy was specified) for the religious 
participants. This contrast did not reach statistical significance, F(1, 182) = 2.27, p = 
.133. In other words, information about reproductive strategy did not seem to override 
these perceptions.  
 Undesirable Fast Traits. The contrast comparing atheist and nonreligious targets 
to the religious target within the no information level of target was not significant for 
nonreligious participants, F(1, 326) = 1.37, p = .243, nor did it reach statistical 
significance for religious participants, F(1, 182) = 3.03, p = .083. Thus, I did not conduct 
the contrasts from Hypothesis 2 for this variable.    
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 Desirable Fast Traits. The contrast comparing atheist and nonreligious targets to 
religious target within the no information level of target strategy was significant for 
nonreligious participants, F(1, 326) = 16.70, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .049, such that atheist and 
nonreligious targets were viewed as more likely to possess these desirable fast traits than 
religious than the religious target. This effect was not significant for religious 
participants, F(1, 182) = 0.00, p = .998, suggesting that this effect is limited to 
nonreligious participants. The contrast from Hypothesis 2 was not significant for the 
nonreligious participants, F(1, 326) = 0.03, p = .857, suggesting that reproductive 
strategy did not override perceptions of desirable fast traits based on target religion.  
 Trust. The atheist and nonreligious vs. religious target contrast was not significant 
for nonreligious participants, F(1, 326) = 0.23, p = .633, but was significant for religious 
participants, F(1, 182) = 5.33, p = .022, η𝑝2  = .028. However, for religious participants, 
the contrast from Hypothesis 2 was not significant, F(1, 182) = 0.74, p = .391.  
 Open-Mindedness. Because I did not expect a significant interaction (i.e., that the 
effect of target religion on perceived open-mindedness would be moderated by target 
strategy), I conducted a single contrast comparing perceptions of nonreligious and atheist 
targets to perceptions of religious targets, collapsed across levels of target strategy. This 
provided more power than testing multiple simple effects.  
 Among nonreligious participants, this contrast was significant, (1, 326) = 95.06, p 
< .001, η𝑝2  = .226. However, there was no effect observed among religious participants, 
F(1, 182) = 0.10, p = .751. Thus, the finding that people view atheists and nonreligious 
individuals as open-minded seems to be driven by nonreligious participants.   
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 Scientific Thinking. I used the same method to assess scientific thinking as open-
mindedness; the contrast was significant among nonreligious participants, F(1, 326) = 
182.93, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .359, as well as religious participants, F(1, 326) = 9.85, p = .002, 
η𝑝
2  = .051. Thus, both religious and nonreligious perceivers rated the atheist and 
nonreligious targets as more likely to base their beliefs on scientific evidence, although 
the effect is much larger among nonreligious observers.  
 Domains of Trust. For the scientific trust scenario, the contrast comparing 
nonreligious and atheist targets to religious targets was significant among nonreligious 
participants, F(1, 326) = 43.76, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .118, but not among religious participants, 
F(1, 182) = 0.00, p = .983, suggesting that religious perceivers do not view religious 
targets as less trustworthy scientists, but nonreligious perceivers do. 
 For the scenario assessing trust at the expense of one’s group, there was no 
significant effect of target religion for nonreligious or religious participants, and I did not 
analyze this scenario further.  
 Finally, for trust with an abortion secret, the contrast was significant among 
nonreligious participants, F(1, 326) = 81.90, p < .001, η𝑝2  = .201, as well as nonreligious 
participants, F(1, 182) = 6.60, p = .011, η𝑝2  = .035. Although the effect was markedly 
smaller among religious participants, both nonreligious and religious participants viewed 
atheists as more likely to keep a secret about an abortion.   
DISCUSSION 
 What do people like about atheists? The answer is a complex one, as atheists 
are neither a cohesive nor homogenous group. In the absence of other information, past 
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suggests that people view atheists as living a relatively “fast” lifestyle—that they are 
relatively uninterested in family, impulsive, and sexually unrestricted (Moon et al., 
2018b, 2018a). Although these traits negatively influence trust, they may be beneficial 
for some purposes: acquiring short-term mates, engaging in risky behavior, and for 
certain coalitional purposes. Like many other aspects of social perception, these traits are 
not viewed as universally positive; whether or not these traits are viewed as favorable 
depends on the motives and vulnerabilities of the perceiver (McArthur & Baron, 1983; 
Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010). Thus, the affordances atheists offer may be more 
attractive to individuals who seek such a lifestyle. Ultimately, whether or not people view 
these perceptions of atheists positively depends on the motivations and vulnerabilities of 
the perceiver.  
 The picture is further complicated when considering the dynamic nature of 
social perception. Perceptions of atheists can be drastically different, depending on 
additional information. Atheists who are highly educated are likely viewed as less 
threatening than atheists who are uneducated (although educated atheists may pose a 
greater intellectual threat; see Cook, Cohen, & Solomon, 2015). The present results 
represent an investigation of additional information about targets’ reproductive strategies. 
This is a small subset of perceptions that might override or interact with religious 
information to shape social perception.  
 Finally, perceptions of atheists likely vary systematically depending on the 
perceiver. Whether or not someone views atheists as “good” for a certain purpose might 
depend on their particular strategy for fulfilling that purpose; for instance, people who 
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prefer committed reproductive strategies are unlikely to search for mates in the same way 
as those who prefer uncommitted strategies, and might value atheists differently as a 
potential “wingman” to help them in this pursuit.  
 The results presented here failed to find evidence for several of the 
hypothesized perceptions of atheists. Most notably, these results did not replicate the 
finding that perceivers tend to rate atheists and nonreligious targets as “faster” than 
religious targets. However, atheists were viewed positively in some ways—as more open-
minded, more scientific, and more trustworthy as scientists and better for keeping a secret 
about an abortion.  
When Do People Trust Atheists? 
 Are atheists trusted? Past research has often assumed that the answer is a 
straightforward “no.” However, a more fine-grained analysis points to several avenues 
for nuance. The question is not whether people trust atheists, but when people trust 
atheists. First, perceptions of trustworthiness are not inflexible—people look to past 
behavior (i.e., whether or not someone previously cooperated), rating cooperators as 
more trustworthy (Barclay, 2004). Second, people often use “trust diagnostic situations” 
or use “strain tests” to ascertain the extent to which they can trust others, continuously 
updating their perceptions as they gather new information (J. A. Simpson, 2007; 
Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999).  
Thus, even if atheists are distrusted in initial interactions, this effect may play less 
of a role as individuals become more familiar with one another. Further, the present 
results suggest that additional information may be stronger determinants of trust (and 
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some other perceived life history traits) than atheism per se (see also Moon et al., 2018a), 
and atheists may be trusted initially as much as their religious counterparts.    
Finally, given some of the constraints on the behavior of religious individuals, 
there are instances where it may make sense to view them as less trustworthy. The current 
data suggest that this may be the case for scientific honesty and trust with an abortion 
secret. That is, people view atheists and nonreligious targets as more likely to report 
scientific findings honestly, even if these findings contradict their worldview. Participants 
also rated the atheists and nonreligious targets as more likely to keep a secret about an 
abortion, perhaps reflecting the understood constraints religion tends to impose on sexual 
morality (Hone et al., 2018; Weeden et al., 2008). These trust effects do not seem to 
depend on a specific method of being trustworthy, as one of them requires divulging 
information and the other requires keeping information secret; these scenarios provide 
instances in which atheists are trusted to do either of these. What seems to matter is the 
content, or the “X” discussed above. When religious beliefs conflict with adherents’ 
ability to carry out some matter, people may trust them less for that purpose.  
Limitations 
Several of my main hypotheses failed to find support in the current data. Most 
notable was the finding that religious people were not trusted more than atheists or 
nonreligious individuals when reproductive strategy was not specified. Past research has 
shown consistently that religious behavior facilitates trust, across a wide range of 
methods and populations. Among villages in South India, people make a host of 
inferences about individuals who engage in costly religious behaviors, and these 
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inferences are made by all villagers, regardless of their religion (Power, 2017). In the 
Tyva Republic, people tend to trust individuals who consistently participate in costly 
religious rituals more than those who do not (Purzycki & Arakchaa, 2013). Studies with 
American participants have found that Christian religious badges (Ash Wednesday ashes 
or a necklace with a cross) increase trust among both Christian and non-Christian 
perceivers (McCullough et al., 2016). Finally, Muslims who engage in religious costly 
signaling are trusted more than Muslims who do not, even by Christian perceivers (Hall 
et al., 2015). In sum, there is strong evidence that religious behavior can increase trust in 
a wide range of situations, even among nonreligious perceivers.  
What accounts for the current study’s non-replication of this common effect? One 
dimension discussed by many of the previous studies is costly signaling. By engaging in 
costly religious behavior, individuals signal something beyond their simple group 
membership—they signal their devotion to the group, as well as other aspects of their 
character (Power, 2017; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003). One possibility, then, is that labeling 
religious targets as “active Christian” did not provide a strong enough cue. If this is the 
case, the effect of target religion on trust may depend on the target’s perceived devotion. 
Indeed, studies with a similar design have found positive effects of religion on trust 
simply by labeling the religious targets as “devoted Christians” or by specifying that they 
attend church regularly (Moon et al., 2018a). Additional data would be useful to test 
whether religious targets who emphasize their devotion are trusted more (and are more 
consistently viewed as “slower”). If 
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to their group, it may be that some of the effects demonstrated here (i.e., differences 
between atheist/nonreligious and religious targets) may even be amplified.  
I also did not find a hypothesized effect for one of the trust scenarios: trust at the 
expense of one’s group. That is, people did not view religious targets as less likely to 
report sexual abuse when it might threaten their group’s reputation. It may be that people 
do not view religious individuals as putting their groups above other ethical interests. 
Another possibility, however, is that people similarly trust all members of cohesive 
groups (whether religious or not) to divulge such scandals. Because the item asked 
participants to imagine the target was a member of a cohesive group, it is difficult to tell 
whether religious people might be trusted less than nonreligious people who do not 
belong to a cohesive group.  
 Finally, although some of the hypothesized effects emerged, the results 
ultimately point to large effects of ingroup bias. Indeed, although even atheists are 
quicker to associate immorality with atheism than with theism (Gervais et al., 2017), 
simpler surveys show that, at least from some samples, atheists may show massive 
ingroup bias in their evaluations of different groups (Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006).   
In all, only two potentially positive perceptions held among religious participants: 
scientific thinking and trust with an abortion secret. This may seem a meager haul, 
especially considering the wide range of affordances tested. However, these positive 
perceptions may play important roles in social perception, and may influence the ways 
people interact with atheists. For some, trusting another with sensitive secrets or being 
able to trust another’s scientific ideas may be important dimensions of social life. 
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Atheists were not viewed positively in most ways, but the perceptions tested here were a 
small subset of the possible affordances people can pose. Almost certainly, there are 
other scenarios in which atheists might be viewed favorably.   
Future Directions 
As discussed above, reproductive strategies seem to be a salient aspect of social 
perception based on religious information. However, there are many other cues that may 
interact with religious information in nuanced ways. Because race significantly 
influences perceptions of life history traits, with Black men in the United States being 
stereotyped as particularly “fast” (Williams et al., 2016), religion may interact in complex 
ways with race to form unique constellations of social perception. For instance, perhaps 
being religious buffers, to some extent, these negative stereotypes of Black men.  
Another possibility is that atheists from certain countries might be viewed 
differently. Whereas atheism is uncommon and violates social norms in some societies, 
other societies are largely secular. To the extent that social perceivers understand these 
dynamics, they may view atheists from secular countries less harshly than atheists from 
largely religious countries, as atheism is to be expected of the former but not the latter.   
 Finally, these results do corroborate the notion that reproductive strategy is 
an important aspect of social perception. Indeed, participants consistently rated 
uncommitted strategists as “fast,” both in desirable and undesirable ways, and committed 
strategists as “slow” and more trustworthy, consistent with Moon et al. (2018a). In other 
words, it seems clear that perceived committed reproductive strategies facilitate trust; it 
remains unclear, however, whether participants in this study viewed religious targets as 
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more committed than atheist or nonreligious targets. Future work is needed to examine 
further the implications of reproductive strategies for social perception. 
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Informed consent 
Dear Participant: 
We are researchers at Arizona State University. We are conducting a research study to 
examine some of your opinions and perceptions of other people. We are inviting your 
participation, which will involve a 7 minute survey. You must be 18 years or older to 
participate in this study. 
 
You will be asked to respond to a series of brief questions, then you will be asked to 
judge another person's social profile. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You 
can skip questions if you wish. You can choose not to participate or to withdraw from the 
study at any time. 
 
You will receive $0.78 payment to your Prolific account, and the benefits of your 
participation will include providing valuable information regarding how people perceive 
and understand different individuals. There are no foreseeable risks or harm from your 
participation. 
 
Your confidentiality will be maintained. Your worker ID will be temporarily stored in 
order to pay our participants for their time. It, and all other potentially identifying 
information that is automatically saved to ensure that each person only participates once, 
will be securely deleted from their associate data file as soon as it is reasonably feasible 
(i.e., once the participant is paid, or after the survey is complete and everyone is paid). 
This data will never be linked to your survey data. Please keep in mind that a worker ID 
can be used to link to your identity. This is a known issue in the online survey community 
and participants have the option of making their personal information private if they 
choose. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, or publications but 
your name will not be known by us or readers of these reports. 
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the research team 
at either jordan.w.moon@asu.edu, or adamcohen@asu.edu. If you have any questions 
about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been 
placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review 
Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. 
 
If you do not agree to participate, please exit the survey at this time. If you agree to 
participate in the survey, please check the box indicating your consent. 
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Figure A1. Fictitious social media profile. Participants viewed this profile including one 
of the religion variants (in order of appearance above: Nonreligious, Religious, Atheist) 
and one of the variants of dating preferences (in order of appearance above: No 
Information, Committed, Uncommitted). Distractor information was held constant across 
conditions.  
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Instructions 
First, we’d like to ask a few questions about you and your beliefs. Please answer as 
honestly as possible. All of your answers will be anonymous. 
Religiosity scale (Cohen et al., 2006) 
 Not 
at all 
Not 
much 
A 
little 
Somewhat Quite 
a bit 
Very 
much 
Deeply or 
extemely 
How strongly do you 
believe in God? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How religious are you? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How spiritual are you? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How important a part 
of your identity is 
religion or faith to you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If someone wanted to 
understand who you are 
as a person, how 
important would 
religion or faith be? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Not 
at all 
     Very 
frequently 
How often do you 
attend religious 
services? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much do you 
practice the 
requirements of a 
religion? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Instructions 
Next, you will be shown a random social media profile, and we will ask you to make some 
guesses about what this person is like. Please pay attention to the profile, both the 
appearance of the person as well as the information he or she provides.  
[One of the profiles will be displayed at random.] 
[The following measures will be displayed in random order.] 
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Positive Slow Life History Traits 
How likely would you say it is that the following traits or behaviors describe [name]? 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
  Neither 
likely 
nor 
unlikely 
  Extremely 
likely 
Would be a sympathetic 
listener 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Has an agreeable personality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tries to be helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Would be nurturing with 
children 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Positive Fast Life History Traits 
 
How likely would you say it is that the following traits or behaviors describe [name]? 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
  Neither 
likely 
nor 
unlikely 
  Extremely 
likely 
Would be fun to party with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Says what he means 
regardless of the 
consequences 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Can tell a good joke 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fun to be around 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Is socially skilled 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Would be a good “wing man” 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Is good in bed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Is cool 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Negative Fast Life History Traits 
How likely would you say it is that the following traits or behaviors describe [name]? 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
  Neither 
likely 
nor 
unlikely 
  Extremely 
likely 
Gets angry quickly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Often acts impulsively 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tries to be socially dominant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Can become hostile to people 
who disagree with him 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tends to manipulate people 
to get what he wants 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Open-Mindedness 
How likely would you say it is that the following traits or behaviors describe [name]? 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
  Neither 
likely 
nor 
unlikely 
  Extremely 
likely 
Open to alternative 
viewpoints 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tries to keep an open mind 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Listens to both sides of 
important issues 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Considers differing opinions 
when forming an opinion 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Scientific Thinking 
How likely would you say it is that the following traits or behaviors describe [name]? 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
  Neither 
likely 
nor 
unlikely 
  Extremely 
likely 
Interested in scientific 
knowledge 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cares a lot about logical 
reasoning 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tries to base all his beliefs 
upon facts, evidence, and 
logic 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Attention Check (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) 
On the next page, you will see a new type of question. SKIP THE QUESTION by 
advancing to the next page without clicking. This question is simply intended to detect 
people who are not paying attention. 
 
[new page] 
 
Which of the following contains gluten [participants are allowed to select and unselect 
multiple responses] 
 
        
White bread        
Sourdough bread        
Brown rice        
Cottage cheese        
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Trust (Hall et al., 2015) 
How likely would you say it is that the following traits or behaviors describe [name]? 
 Extremely 
unlikely 
  Neither 
likely 
nor 
unlikely 
  Extremely 
likely 
Benevolent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Has integrity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Has the ability to be 
trustworthy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Is trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If you loaned him[her] 
money, you would expect to 
get it back 
       
Can be trusted with a 
sensitive secret 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Domains of Trust [1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely] 
 
Scientific trust 
Imagine Jason is an intern in a scientific lab. Some of the experiments he has run 
lately run counter to the way he views the world. 
 
How likely do you think Jason would be to report these results honestly? 
 
Trust at the expense of one’s group 
Imagine Jason is part of a close-knit social group. He discovers that the leader of 
his social group is guilty of sexual misconduct, but no one else knows about it. If 
this knowledge becomes public, it could ruin the reputation of the group. 
 
How likely do you think Jason would be to report this crime? 
 
Abortion secret 
Jason finds out that one of his friends recently had an abortion. She asks him to 
keep the abortion secret, no matter what. 
 
How likely do you think Jason would be to keep this secret? 
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Brief Demographic Questionnaire 
 
What is your gender? 
 • Male 
 • Female 
 
What is your age in years? 
 • Dropdown menu from 18-90 
 
What is your sexual orientation? 
 • Heterosexual/straight 
 • Homosexual/gay/lesbian 
 • Bisexual 
 • Other (please specify) 
 
What is your current relationship status? 
 • Married 
 • In a committed relationships 
 • Dating one person 
 • Dating several people 
 • Single 
 • Other (please specify) 
 
What is your religious affiliation? 
 • Catholic 
 • Christian – Protestant  
 • Christian – other  
 • Mormon 
 • Jewish 
 • Muslim 
 • Hindu 
 • Buddhist 
 • Spiritual but not religious 
 • Atheist 
 • Agnostic 
 • Other (please specify) 
 
Do you have any comments about the study? 
[text box for free response] 
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Debriefing 
 
Thank you for completing our survey. You were shown a profile and asked to rate the 
person in the profile on several traits. Our goal is to examine which inferences people 
make about others based on different types of information. 
 
If you would like to know more about the study, please contact Jordan Moon at 
jordan.w.moon@asu.edu or Adam Cohen at adam.cohen@asu.edu.  
